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ABSTRACT
We argue that in classical and quantum theories of gravity the con-
figuration space and Hilbert space may not be constructible through any
finite procedure. If this is the case then the “problem of time” in quantum
cosmology may be a pseudo-problem, because the argument that time dis-
appears from the theory depends on constructions that cannot be realized
by any finite beings that live in the universe. We propose an alternative
formulation of quantum cosmological theories in which it is only necessary
to predict the amplitudes for any given state to evolve to a finite number
of possible successor states. The space of accessible states of the system is
then constructed as the universe evolves from any initial state. In this kind
of formulation of quantum cosmology time and causality are built in at the
fundamental level. An example of such a theory is the recent path integral
formulation of quantum gravity of Markopoulou and Smolin, but there are
a wide class of theories of this type.
∗ smolin@phys.psu.edu
1
1 Introduction
The problem of time in quantum cosmology is one of the key conceptual
problems faced by theoretical physics at the present time. Although it was
first raised during the 1950’s, it has resisted solution, despite many different
kinds of attempts[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Here we would like to propose a new kind
of approach to the problem. Basically, we will argue that the problem is
not with time, but with some of the assumptions that lead to the conclusion
that there is a problem. These are assumptions that are quite satisfactory
in ordinary quantum mechanics, but that are problematic in quantum grav-
ity, because they may not be realizable with any constructive procedure.
In a quantum theory of cosmology this is a serious problem, because one
wants any theoretical construction that we use to describe the universe to
be something that can be realized in a finite time, by beings like ourselves
that live in that universe. If the quantum theory of cosmology requires a
non-constructible procedure to define its formal setting, it is something that
could only be of use to a mythical creature of infinite capability. One of the
things we would like to demand of a quantum theory of cosmology is that it
not make any reference to anything at all that might be posited or imagined
to exist outside the closed system which is the universe itself.
We believe that this requirement has a number of consequences for the
problem of constructing quantum a good quantum theory of cosmology.
These have been discussed in detail elsewhere [4, 6, 7]. Here we would like
to describe one more implication of the requirement, which appears to bear
on the problem of time.
We begin by summarizing briefly the argument that time is not present
in a quantum theory of cosmology. In section 3 we introduce a worry that
one of the assumptions of the argument may not be realizable by any finite
procedure. (Whether this is actually the case is not known presently.) We
explain how the argument for the disappearance of time would be affected
by this circumstance. Then we explain how a quantum theory of cosmology
might be made which overcomes the problem, but at the cost of introducing
a notion of time and causality at a fundamental level. As an example we
refer to recent work on the path integral for quantum gravity[8], but the
form of the theory we propose is more general, and may apply to a wide
class of theories beyond quantum general relativity.
2
2 The argument for the absence of time
The argument that time is not a fundamental aspect of the world goes like
this1. In classical mechanics one begins with a space of configurations C
of a system S. Usually the system S is assumed to be a subsystem of the
universe. In this case there is a clock outside the system, which is carried
by some inertial observer. This clock is used to label the trajectory of the
system in the configuration space C. The classical trajectories are then
extrema of some action principle, δI = 0.
Were it not for the external clock, one could already say that time has
disappeared, as each trajectory exists all at once as a curve γ on C. Once
the trajectory is chosen, the whole history of the system is determined. In
this sense there is nothing in the description that corresponds to what we
are used to thinking of as a flow or progression of time. Indeed, just as the
whole of any one trajectory exists when any point and velocity are specified,
the whole set of trajectories may be said to exist as well, as a timeless set
of possibilities.
Time is in fact represented in the description, but it is not in any sense
a time that is associated with the system itself. Instead, the t in ordinary
classical mechanics refers to a clock carried by an inertial observer, which
is not part of the dynamical system being modeled. This external clock is
represented in the configuration space description as a special parameter-
ization of each trajectory, according to which the equations of motion are
satisfied. Thus, it may be said that there is no sense in which time as some-
thing physical is represented in classical mechanics, instead the problem is
postponed, as what is represented is time as marked by a clock that exists
outside of the physical system which is modeled by the trajectories in the
configuration space C.
In quantum mechanics the situation is rather similar. There is a t in the
quantum state and the Schroedinger equation, but it is time as measured
by an external clock, which is not part of the system being modeled. Thus,
when we write,
ıh¯
d
dt
Ψ(t) = HˆΨ(t) (1)
the Hamiltonian refers to evolution, as it would be measured by an external
observer, who refers to the external clock whose reading is t
The quantum state can be represented as a function Ψ over the con-
figuration space, which is normalizable in some inner product. The inner
1For more details and discussion see [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
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product is another a priori structure, it refers also to the external clock, as
it is the structure that allows us to represent the conservation of probability
as measured by that clock.
When we turn to the problem of constructing a cosmological theory we
face a key problem, which is that there is no external clock. There is by
definition nothing outside of the system, which means that the interpreta-
tion of the theory must be made without reference to anything that is not
part of the system which is modeled. In classical cosmological theories, such
as general relativity applied to spatially compact universes, or models such
as the Bianchi cosmologies or the Barbour-Bertotti model[9, 10], this is ex-
pressed by the dynamics having a gauge invariance, which includes arbitrary
reparameterizations of the classical trajectories. (In general relativity this is
part of the diffeomorphism invariance of the theory.) As a result, the clas-
sical theory is expressed in a way that makes no reference to any particular
parameterization of the trajectories. Any parameterization is as good as
any other, none has any physical meaning. The solutions are then labeled
by a trajectory, γ, period, there is no reference to a parameterization.
This is the sense in which time may be said to disappear from classical
cosmological theories. There is nothing in the theory that refers to any time
at all. At least without a good deal more work, the theory speaks only in
terms of the whole history or trajectory, it seems to have nothing to say
about what the world is like at a particular moment.
There is one apparently straightforward way out of this, which is to
try to define an intrinsic notion of time, in terms of physical observables.
One may construct parameter independent observables that describe what
is happening at a point on the trajectory if that point can be labeled intrin-
sically by some physical property. For example, one might consider some
particular degree of freedom to be an intrinsic, physical clock, and label the
points on the trajectory by its value. This works in some model systems,
but in interesting cases such as general relativity it is not known if such an
intrinsic notion of time exists which is well defined over the whole of the
configuration space.
In the quantum theory there is a corresponding phenomenon. As there
is no external t with which to measure evolution of the quantum state one
has instead of (1) the quantum constraint equation
HˆΨ = 0 (2)
where Ψ is now just a function on the configuration space. Rather than
describing evolution, eq. (2) generates arbitrary parameterizations of the
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trajectories. The wavefunction must be normalizable under an inner prod-
uct, given by some density ρ on the configuration space. The space of
physical states is then given by (2) subject to
1 =
∫
C
ρΨ¯Ψ (3)
We see that, at least naively time has completely disappeared from the
formalism. This has led to what is called the “problem of time in quantum
cosmology”, which is how to either A) find an interpretation of the theory
that restores a role for time or B) provide an interpretation according to
which time is not part of a fundamental description of the world, but only
reappears in an appropriate classical limit.
There have been various attempts at either direction. We will not de-
scribe them here, except to say that, in our opinion, so far none has proved
completely satisfactory2. There are a number of attempts at A) which suc-
ceed when applied to either models or the semiclassical limit, but it is not
clear whether any of them overcome technical obstacles of various kinds
when applied to the full theory. The most well formulated attempt of type
B), which is that of Barbour[5], may very well be logically consistent. But
it forces one to swallow quite a radical point of view about the relationship
between time and our experience.
Given this situation, we would like to propose that the problem may be
not with time, but with the assumptions of the argument that leads to time
being absent. Given the number of attempts that have been made to resolve
the problem, which have not so far led to a good solution, perhaps it might
be better to try to dissolve the issue by questioning one of the assumptions
of the argument that leads to the statement of the problem. This is what
we would like to do in the following.
3 A problem with the argument for the disappear-
ance of time
Both the classical and quantum mechanical versions of the argument for the
disappearance of time begin with the specification of the classical configura-
tion space C. This seems an innocent enough assumption. For a system of N
particles in d dimensional Euclidean space, it is simply RNd. One can then
find the corresponding basis of the Hilbert space by simply enumerating the
2For good critical reviews that deflate most known proposals, see [1, 2].
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Fourier modes. Thus, for cases such as this, it is certainly the case that
the configuration space and the Hilbert space structure can be specified a
priori.
However, there are good reasons to suspect that for cosmological theories
it may not be so easy to specify the whole of the configuration or Hilbert
space. For example, it is known that the configuration spaces of theories that
implement relational notions of space are quite complicated. One example
is the Barbour-Bertotti model[9, 10], whose configuration space consists of
the relative distances between N particles in d dimensional Euclidean space.
While it is presumably specifiable in closed form, this configuration space is
rather complicated, as it is the quotient of RNd by the Euclidean group in
d dimensions[5].
The configuration space of compact three geometries is even more com-
plicated, as it is the quotient of the space of metrics by the diffeomorphism
group. It is known not to be a manifold everywhere. Furthermore, it has a
preferred end, where the volume of the universe vanishes.
These examples serve to show that the configuration spaces of cosmo-
logical theories are not simple spaces like RNd, but may be considerably
complicated. This raises a question: could there be a theory so compli-
cated that its space of configurations is not constructible through any finite
procedure? For example, is it possible that the topology of an infinite di-
mensional configuration space were not finitely specifiable? And were this
the case, what would be the implications for how we understand dynamics3?
We do not know whether in fact the configuration space of general rel-
ativity is finitely specifiable. The problem is hard because the physical
configuration space is not the space of three metrics. It is instead the space
of equivalence classes of three metrics (or connections, in some formalisms)
under diffeomorphisms. The problem is that it is not known if there is any
effective procedure which will label the equivalence classes.
One can in fact see this issue in one approach to describing the config-
uration space, due to Newman and Rovelli[12]. There the physical config-
3There is an analogous issue in theoretical biology. The problem is that it does not
appear that a pre-specifiable set of “functionalities” exists in biology, where pre-specifiable
means a compact description of an effective procedure to characterize ahead of time,
each member of the set[11, 7]. This problem seems to limit the possibilities of a formal
framework for biology in which there is a pre-specified space of states which describe the
functionalities of elements of a biological system. Similarly, one may question whether it
is in principle possible in economic theory to give in advance an a priori list of all the
possible kinds of jobs, or goods or services[11].
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uration space consists of the diffeomorphism equivalence classes of a set of
three flows on a three manifold. (These come from the intersections of the
level surfaces of three functions.) These classes are partially characterized
by the topologies of the flow lines of the vector fields. We may note that
these flow lines may knot and link, thus a part of the problem of specifying
the configuration space involves classifying the knotting and linking among
the flow lines.
Thus, the configuration space of general relativity cannot be completely
described unless the possible ways that flow lines may knot and link in three
dimensions are finitely specifiable. It may be noted that there is a decision
procedure, due to Hacken, for knots, although it is very cumbersome[13].
However, it is not obvious that this is sufficient to give a decision procedure
for configurations in general relativity, because there we are concerned with
smooth data. In the smooth category the flow lines may knot and link an
infinite number of times in any bounded region. The resulting knots may
not be classifiable. All that is known is that knots with a finite number of
crossings are classifiable. If these is no decision procedure to classify the
knotting and linking of smooth flow lines then the points of the configu-
ration space of general relativity may not be distinguished by any decision
procedure. This means that the configuration space is not constructible by
any finite procedure.
When we turn from the classical to the quantum theory the same issue
arises. First of all, if the configuration space is not constructible through
any finite procedure, then there is no finite procedure to define normalizable
wave functions on that space. One might still wonder whether there is some
constructible basis for the theory. Given the progress of the last few years in
quantum gravity we can investigate this question directly, as we know more
about the space of quantum states of general relativity than we do about
the configuration space of the theory. This is because it has been shown
that the space of spatially diffeomorphism invariant states of the quantum
gravitational field has a basis which is in one to one correspondence with the
diffeomorphism classes of a certain set of embedded, labeled graphs Γ, in a
given three manifold Σ [14, 15]. These are arbitrary graphs, whose edges
are labeled by spins and whose vertices are labeled by the distinct ways to
combine the spins in the edges that meet there quantum mechanically. These
graphs are called spin networks, they were invented originally by Roger
Penrose[16], and then discovered to play this role in quantum gravity4.
4For a review of these developments see [17]. These results have also more recently been
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Thus, we cannot label all the basis elements of quantum general relativity
unless the diffeomorphism classes of the embeddings of spin networks in a
three manifold Σ may be classified. But it is not known whether this is the
case. The same procedure that classifies the knots is not, at least as far as
is known, extendible to the case of embeddings of graphs.
What if it is the case that the diffeomorphism classes of the embeddings
of spin networks cannot be classified? While it may be possible to give a
finite procedure that generates all the embeddings of spin networks, if they
are not classifiable there will be no finite procedure to tell if a given one
produced is or is not the same as a previous network in the list. In this
case there will be no finite procedure to write the completeness relation or
expand a given state in terms of the basis. There will consequently be no
finite procedure to test whether an operator is unitary or not. Without
being able to do any of these things, we cannot really say that we have
a conventional quantum mechanical description. If spin networks are not
classifiable, then we cannot construct the Hilbert space of quantum general
relativity.
In this case then the whole set up of the problem of time fails. If
the Hilbert space of spatially diffeomorphism invariant states is not con-
structible, then we cannot formulate a quantum theory of cosmology in
these terms. There may be something that corresponds to a “wavefunction
of the universe” but it cannot be a vector in a constructible Hilbert space.
Similarly, if the configuration space C of the theory is not constructible,
then we cannot describe the quantum state of the universe in terms of a
normalizable function on C.
We may note that a similar argument arises for the path integral for-
mulations of quantum gravity. It is definitely known that four manifolds
are not classifiable; this means that path integral formulations of quantum
gravity that include sums over topologies are not constructible through a
finite procedure[20].
Someone may object that these arguments have to do with quantum
general relativity, which is in any case unlikely to exist. One might even
like to use this problem as an argument against quantum general relativity.
However, the argument only uses the kinematics of the theory, which is that
the configuration space includes diffeomorphism and gauge invariant classes
of some metric or connection. It uses nothing about the actual dynamics
formulated as theorems in a rigorous formulation of diffeomorphism invariant quantum
field theories[19, 18].
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of the theory, nor does it assume anything about which matter fields are
included. Thus, the argument applies to a large class of theories, including
supergravity.
4 Can we do physics without a constructible state
space?
What if it is the case that the Hilbert space of quantum gravity is not con-
structible because embedded graphs in three space are not classifiable? How
do we do physics? We would like to argue now that there is a straightfor-
ward answer to this question. But it is one that necessarily involves the
introduction of notions of time and causality.
One model for how to do physics in the absence of a constructible Hilbert
space is seen in a recent formulation of the path integral for quantum gravity
in terms of spin networks by Markopoulou and Smolin[8]5. In this case one
may begin with an initial spin network Γ0 with a finite number of edges
and nodes (This corresponds to the volume of space being finite.) One then
has a finite procedure that constructs a finite set of possible successor spin
networks Γα1 , where α labels the different possibilities. To each of these the
theory associates a quantum amplitude AΓ0→Γα1 .
The procedure may then be applied to each of these, producing a new
set Γαβ
2
. Here Γαβ
2
labels the possible successors to each of the Γα1 . The
procedure may be iterated any finite number of times N , producing a set
of spin networks SN
Γ0
that grow out of the initial spin network Γ0 after N
steps. SN
Γ0
is itself a directed graph, where two spin networks are joined if
one is a successor of the other. There may be more than one path in SN
Γ0
between Γ0 and some spin network Γfinal. The amplitude for Γ0 to evolve
to Γfinal is then the sum over the paths that join them in S
N
Γ0
, in the limit
N →∞ of the products of the amplitudes for each step along the way.
For any finite N , SN
Γ0
has a finite number of elements and the procedure
is finitely specifiable. There may be issues about taking the limit N → ∞,
but there is no reason to think that they are worse than similar problems in
quantum mechanics or quantum field theory. In any case, there is a sense
5This followed the development of a Euclidean path integral by Reisenberger[21] and
by Reisenberger and Rovelli[22]. Very interesting related work has also been done by
John Baez[23]. We may note that the theory described in [8] involves non-embedded spin
networks, which probably are classifiable, but it can be extended to give a theory of the
evolution of embedded spin networks.
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in which each step takes a certain amount of time, in the limit N →∞ we
will be picking up the probability amplitude for the transition to happen in
infinite time.
Each step represents a finite time evolution because it corresponds to
certain causal processes by which information is propagated in the spin
network. The rule by which the amplitude is specified satisfies a principle
of causality, by which information about an element of a successor network
only depends on a small region of the its predecessor. There are then discrete
analogues of light cones and causal structures in the theory. Because the
geometry associated to the spin networks is discrete[14], the process by which
information at two nearby nodes or edges may propagate to jointly influence
the successor network is finite, not infinitesimal.
In ordinary quantum systems it is usually the case that there is a non-
vanishing probability for a state to evolve to an infinite number of elements of
a basis after a finite amount of time. The procedure we’ve just described then
differs from ordinary quantum mechanics, in that there are a finite number
of possible successors for each basis state after a finite evolution. The reason
is again causality and discreteness: since the spin networks represent discrete
quantum geometries, and since information must only flow to neighboring
sites of the graph in a finite series of steps, at each elementary step there
are only a finite number of things that can happen.
We may note that if the Hilbert space is not constructible, we cannot
ask if this procedure is unitary. But we can still normalize the amplitudes
so that the sum of the absolute squares of the amplitudes to evolve from
any spin network to its successors is unity. This gives us something weaker
than unitarity, but strong enough to guarantee that probability is conserved
locally in the space of configurations.
To summarize, in such an approach, the amplitude to evolve from the
initial spin network Γ0 to any element of S
N
Γ0
, for large finiteN is computable,
even if it is the case that the spin networks cannot be classified so that the
basis itself is not finitely specifiable. Thus, such a procedure gives a way
to do quantum physics even for cases in which the Hilbert space is not
constructible.
We may make two comments about this form of resolution of the prob-
lem. First, it necessarily involves an element of time and causality. The
way in which the amplitudes are constructed in the absence of a specifiable
basis or Hilbert structure requires a notion of successor states. The theory
never has to ask about the whole space of states, it only explores a finite
set of successor states at each step. Thus, a notion of time is necessarily
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introduced.
Second, we might ask how we might formalize such a theory. The role
of the space of all states is replaced by the notion of the successor states
of a given network. The immediate successors to a graph Γ0 may be called
the adjacent possible[7]. They are finite in number and constructible. They
replace the idealization of all possible states that is used in ordinary quantum
mechanics. We may note a similar notion of an adjacent possible set of
configurations, reachable from a given configuration in one step, plays a role
in formalizations of the self-organization of biological and other complex
systems[7].
In such a formulation there is no need to construct the state space a
priori, or equip it with a structure such as an inner product. One has
simply a set of rules by which a set of possible configurations and histories
of the universe is constructed by a finite procedure, given any initial state.
In a sense it may be said that the system is constructing the space of its
possible states and histories as it evolves.
Of course, were we to do this for all initial states, we would have con-
structed the entire state space of the theory. But there are an infinite number
of possible initial states and, as we have been arguing, they may not be clas-
sifiable. In this case it is the evolution itself that constructs the subspace
of the space of states that is needed to describe the possible futures of any
given state. And by doing so the construction gives us an intrinsic notion
of time.
5 Conclusions
We must emphasize first of all that these comments are meant to be prelim-
inary. Their ultimate relevance rests partly on the issue of whether there
is a decision procedure for spin networks (or perhaps for some extension of
them that turns out to be relevant for real quantum gravity[17].). But more
importantly, it suggests an alternative type of framework for constructing
quantum theories of cosmology, in which there is no a priori configuration
space or Hilbert space structure, but in which the theory is defined entirely
in terms of the sets of adjacent possible configurations, accessible from any
given configuration. Whether such formulations turn out to be successful at
resolving all the problems of quantum gravity and cosmology is a question
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that must be left for the future6.
There are further implications for theories of cosmology, if it turns out
to be the case that their configuration space or state space is not finitely
constructible. One is to the problem of whether the second law of thermo-
dynamics applies at a cosmological scale. If the configuration space or state
space is not constructible, then it is not clear that the ergodic hypothesis is
well defined or useful. Neither may the standard formulations of statistical
mechanics be applied. What is then needed is a new approach to statistical
physics based only on the evolving set of possibilities generated by the evo-
lution from a given initial state. It is possible to speculate whether there
may in such a context be a “fourth law” of thermodynamics in which the
evolution extremizes the dimension of the adjacent possible, which is the set
of states accessible to the system at any stage in its evolution[7].
Finally, we may note that there are other reasons to suppose that a quan-
tum cosmological theory must incorporate some mechanisms analogous to
the self-organization of complex systems[6]. For example, these may be nec-
essary to tune the system to the critical behavior necessary for the existence
of the classical limit[25, 8]. This may also be necessary if the universe is to
have sufficient complexity that a four manifolds worth of spacetime events
are completely distinguished by purely relational observables[4, 6]. The ar-
guments given here are complementary to those, and provide yet another
way in which notions of self-organization may play a role in a fundamental
cosmological theory.
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